Establishing secure communication in a wireless network such as Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is particularly challenging because: (i) the network is self-organizing; (ii) messages are broadcasted; (iii) messages travel in a hop-by-hop manner; (iv) nodes are constrained in terms of computation and battery power. We propose a flexible and efficient Certificateless Encryption scheme which is optimized for MANET environment. Further, we couple the idea of Resurrecting Duckling with the scheme to achieve efficient key establishment and demonstrate the use of the transparent policy encoder which facilitates the authentication. We also show the security of the scheme in random oracle model assuming k-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem is hard.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless network is gaining increasing attention due to its freedom in connectivity. Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is one such a network where it is particularly challenging to enforce security. This is because MANET is a self-organizing wireless network where messages are broadcasted to travel hopby-hop and nodes are limited in terms of computational power and battery. These characteristics make MANET vulnerable to various kind of attacks ranging from passive attacks (eg. eavesdropping on broadcasted messages) to active attacks (eg. compromising nodes).
Identity Based Encryption (BF-IBE) by Boneh and Franklin (Boneh and Franklin, 2001 ) has been a popular choice as a cryptographic primitive in MANET due to its low infrastructural cost and convenience in deriving the authentic public key. One disadvantage of IBE however, is the forced unconditional trust towards the Private Key Generator (PKG). This limits the use of IBE to a closed environment where key escrow is acceptable.
Thus majority of previous attempts involved the use of threshold cryptography (Bohio and Miri, 2004; Luo et al., 2002; Pan et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2005) in order to provide secure communication in MANET. While threshold public key cryptography helps establishing escrow free secure communication without the presence of a central authority, it is not a favorable choice due to the following reasons: (i) n number of nodes need to be online and reachable at a given time for key establishment; (ii) incurs a high overhead during the decryption.
On the other hand, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed Certificateless Encryption (CLE) (Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003) in an effort to overcome the key escrow problem of IBE. CLE does this successfully while remaining non-directory based by incorporating positive aspects from both IBE (implicit authentication of a public key via its associated identity) and conventional PKC (user contributed secret in private key generation). Yet, their CLE carries over similar computational burden including map-to-point hash function and pairings involved in both encryption and decryption due to its close resemblance to BF-IBE.
Another IBE scheme proposed by Sakai and Kasahara (SK-IBE) (Sakai and Kasahara, 2003) in 2003 has not received much attention due to the lack of security proof which was not available until Chen and Cheng (Chen and Cheng, 2005) proved its security under k-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (BDHI) assumption. SK-IBE presents better efficiency by avoiding map-to-point hash function and reducing the number of pairing operations required to one.
In 2006, Libert and Quisquater (Libert and Quisquater, 2006 ) gave a construction of CLE which is computationally more efficient than previously pro-posed CLE schemes from the above observation. However, their public key size is too big as it is an element in the extension field (typical size of 1024 bits). Although they suggest the use of two special types of curves which can reduce the size of public key by a considerable amount, it adds extra complexity.
While the consequence of these drawbacks may be subtle in a desktop environment, its effect can be significant in a resource constrained environment such as Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). With this motivation we propose a CLE scheme optimized for efficient computation, storage and communication.
Contribution
We propose a CLE scheme which is optimized for efficiency, targeting the resource constrained environment such as MANET. Specifically, our scheme is more efficient than the scheme by Libert and Quisquater by two field exponentiations in computation-wise and up to 40% in public key sizewise when MNT curves (Miyaji et al., 2001 ) are used.
Our scheme facilitates secure communication in MANET with efficient key establishment which can readily be initiated due to the virtue of key escrow freeness. Further, the use of the transparent policy encoder eases authentication process.
Our scheme is secure against adaptive chosenciphertext-attack in the random oracle model assuming k-BDHI assumption holds. We show the reduction by closely modeling the adversary model in (AlRiyami and Paterson, 2003) and applying the result in (Chen and Cheng, 2005) . We also show that our scheme is resistant to the recent attack by Au et al. (Au et al., 2007) . Due to space limitation, we omit the security proof (available in the full version of the paper).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the necessary background for the Basic and Full Scheme presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show key establishment followed by performance analysis in Section 5. Finally we show the conclusion and future works in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the necessary mathematical background required.
Bilinear Groups
G 1 , G 2 and G T are cyclic groups of prime order q. P 1 is a generator of G 1 and P 2 is a generator of G 2 . ψ is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 with ψ(P 2 ) = P 1 .ê is a bilinear mapê :
Necessary requirements for the bilinear mapê are:
Bilinear. For all P ∈ G 1 and all Q ∈ G 2 and all a, b ∈ Z we haveê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab .
Non-degenerate:ê(P 1 , P 2 ) = 1.
Computable:
There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P and Q.
Assumptions
Assumption 1 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH).).
Security Model
Let K be a security parameter, and M and C denote the plaintext and ciphertext spaces respectively. A CLE system consists of the following polynomially bounded algorithms.
Setup. Given security parameter K , returns a master public key M pk and a master secret key M sk .
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Given M pk , M sk and ID A ∈ {0, 1} * , which is an identifier string for entity A, returns the corresponding partial private key ∂d A .
Extract. Given M pk , ∂d A and the user chosen secret k, returns the corresponding full private key d A .
Set-Public-Key : Given M pk and the user chosen secret k, returns the randomly generated public key K pub .
Encrypt. Given M pk , ID A , K pub and a message m ∈ M, returns the ciphertext C ∈ C.
Decrypt. Given M pk , ID A , d A and C, returns the plaintext m or a failure symbol ⊥.
Next, we define the security of our scheme using the following game model. 4. Request public key on (ID i ): C returns the public key generated by running Set-Public-Key.
Setup

Replace public key for (ID i ):
A is free to make any valid change to the given public key and request to replace its given public key to the modified public key.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, A outputs two equal length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M, and an identity ID ch on which A wishes to be challenged. The only constraint is that A must not have queried the extraction oracle on ID ch in Phase 1. C picks a bit b ∈ R {0, 1} and sets 2) has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the described game model.
EFFICIENT CLE SCHEMES
Basic Scheme
Setup. Given a security parameter K ∈ Z + , generate the following:
1. Three groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of prime order q and a bilinear mapê :
Random generators P 1 ∈ G 1 , P 2 ∈ G 2 and a random master secret s ∈ Z * q then set P pub = sP 2 . 3. Cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * q , H 2 : G T → {0, 1} n for some integer n > 0. Finally publish M pk = q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, ψ, P 1 , P 2 , P pub , H 1 , H 2 , n as the master public key and M sk = s as the master private key. The plaintext space is M = {0, 1} n and the ciphertext space is C = G 1 × {0, 1} n .
Partial-Private-Key-Extract. Given a string identifier for an entity A ID A ∈ {0, 1} n ,k, M pk and M sk , do the following:
Compute the partial private key as ∂d
Extract. Given M pk , a partial private key ∂d A and user's chosen secret k, do the following:
Set the private key as
Set-Public-Key. Given M pk and the user chosen secret k, generate the public key K pub as follows. needs only be computed once.
Then encrypt as
Decrypt. Given C, d A and M pk :
Above is true since,
Full Scheme
This scheme is constructed by applying FO transformation (Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999) to Basic Scheme.
1. Follows the Steps 1-3 of Basic Scheme's Setup.
Two additional cryptographic hash functions
H 3 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → Z * q and H 4 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n for some integer n > 0. 
KEY ESTABLISHMENT
The characteristics of MANET demand an efficient, escrow-free and self-configuring encryption scheme in order to establish secure communication between the participating nodes. Many threshold-based cryptographic approaches proposed so far are not adequate for MANET for at least two reasons: (i) n number of nodes need to be online and reachable at a given time for key establishment; (ii) incurs a high overhead during the decryption. Resurrecting Duckling is a novel approach by Stajano and Anderson (Stajano and Anderson, 2000) for key establishment in MANET. The idea is simple, a node A will recognize another node B as its master if B sends A a secret key before any other node does (known as imprinting). This allows the network to readily begin secure communication instead of having to wait until a certain number of nodes become available in the network. However, such a master-slave relationship between nodes are not suitable where every node is autonomous and compromising a master node can significantly endanger the security of its slave nodes.
We propose the use of our scheme combined with Resurrecting Duckling idea to leverage the vulnerable master-slave relationship to facilitator-benefitor relationship. Due to the escrow free property of CLE, a node A acting as a PKG does not have the full control over the other node B which obtains its partial private key from A. Instead, A merely facilitates the secure communication (by setting up the public parameters and generating the partial private key) and B benefits from A's service. By using the blinding technique, the secure channel (such as SSL) between A and B need not be established when transferring the partial private key. We now describe how the key establishment can readily start in the absence of any online central authority (N is the number of existing nodes). N = 2: Node A and B come in contact of each other.
• A and B starts negotiating on the public parameter selection for their secure communication.
Note that each node will choose its master secret independently as s A and s B .
• Once the negotiation is done, A chooses a blinding factor x ∈ R Z * q and sends (ID A ,k, xP 2 ) to B. N > 2: Another node C joins the network.
• C broadcasts the request that it wishes to join the network.
• Nodes willing to provide PKG service will reply to the request.
• C randomly selects one among the replied nodes.
• The rest follows the same procedure as in N = 2 case.
4.1k as the Transparent Policy Encoder
In this subsection, we demonstrate how to usek as the policy encoder and show how its transparency can ease the task of authentication. Recall that in our Basic and Full Scheme, we have usedk as a simple random element in Z * q . Instead, we can usek as the policy encoder (eg. validity period, location info, etc) which can be determined during the negotiation phase. For example, one may definek = sP 2 ⊕ policy.
Then, nodes C and D each of which have been issued its partial private key from different PKG nodes A and B respectively, can easily authenticate each other in the following way.
• C sends its public key (k C P 1 , k C P pub ,k C ) and s A P 2 to D • D obtains policy =k C ⊕ s A P 2 and checks if the policy is valid.
• D follows the same procedure to be authenticated by C.
• If both C and D are satisfied with each other's policy, they can start secure communication.
PERFORMANCE
In the Table 1 and 2, we compare the efficiency of different CLE schemes with respect to the number of operations required and their public key sizes. Although encryption schemes presented in (Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003; Libert and Quisquater, 2006) imply the use of supersingular curves, for a fair efficiency comparison, we assume MNT curves are used. Also it is assumed that point compression techniques are applied. (+160) in the Table 2 denotes the additional bits needed whenk is used separately as the policy encoder. Note that in Table 1 , we have not included the computation required for the public key check since this only needs to be done once for each new user. (Libert and Quisquater, 2006) outperforms (AlRiyami and Paterson, 2003) by 1 pairing in encryption. Since pairing is the cost-dominant operation, this gain outweighs the performance loss due to some other extra computations. Our scheme makes further performance improvement by reducing one element exponentiation in each encryption and decryption.
While we are aware of the recently proposed CLE without pairing by Sun et al. (Y. Sun and Baek, 2007) , it is not included in our comparison. This is because although this scheme requires less computation, its public key size is bigger hence making a straightforward comparison difficult. To conduct a comparison, the difference between significance of reducing computational cost and reducing communication cost in MANET needs to be studied and is beyond the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have presented a provably secure efficient certificateless encryption scheme. We have shown that our scheme is an ideal choice for key establishment in MANET when coupled with Resurrecting Duckling idea. Further, we have shown how the use of transparent policy encoder eases the authentication task. The security of our scheme has been proven against adaptive-chosen-ciphertext-attack in the random oracle model assuming k-BDHI holds. To further enhance our proposal we suggest PGP's web of trust concept (Abdul-Rahman, 1997) to manage the trust level of each node in the network for determining the potential candidate to take the PKG's role. This will aid in avoiding or detecting dishonest node behaviours (eg. node impersonation). 
